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There have been previous works that tried to study what determines the oc-
cupational choices of agents. For example, several economists, Lucas (1978)
among them, have built models where agents can choose between being ei-
ther entrepreneurs or workers. These works determine endogenously the
proportion of the total work force that decides to be either an entrepreneur
or a worker; this way they …nd the average size of a …rm. In this type of
models, agents di¤er in their entrepreneurial capacities, so that agents with
low capabilities will decide to be workers. On a di¤erent type of model de-
veloped by Kihlstrom and La¤ont (1979), agents di¤er on their level of risk
aversion: agents with low risk aversion will be entrepreneurs. Nevertheless,
these representations of the occupational decision making agents are proba-
bly the most adequate for developed countries, where most agents are either
entrepreneurs or workers. However, these models are an inadequate way
of representing the labor force distribution from less developed countries,
where an important proportion of the total work force are self-employed
workers.
There is a strong relationship between the per capita income of a country
and the ratio of wage employees and self-employed workers. For example,
developed countries have on average 15 workers that earn a wage for each
worker that is self-employed; on the other extreme, underdeveloped coun-
tries have on average 7 self-employed workers for each worker that earns a
wage. Any research work whose main purpose is to analyze and compre-
hend the main economic and social problems faced by the poorest people
in society, must study self-employment formation. This work builds a gen-
1eral equilibrium model that introduces self-employment as an occupational
choice.
Banerjee and Newman (1993), have built a model where self-employment
is an occupational choice. In their work, poor agents choose working for
a wage over self-employment, and rich agents become entrepreneurs. Oc-
cupational decisions are based on an initial wealth distribution function.
Because of the existence of a collateral, rich individuals can receive a loan
in order become entrepreneurs. Middle class agents receive a smaller loan
that allows them to enter to self-employment. Nevertheless, in most third
world countries, most small entrepreneurs live on economic activities that
provide a subsistence level of income, and most of them are poorer than
wage earners. These fact contradicts Banerjee and Newman (1993), where
wage earners are poorer than agents in self-employment.
Recently, more models have been introduced which attempt to study
occupational choice dynamics. Antunes and Cavalcanti (2002) build a gen-
eral equilibrium model with credit constraints, where agents can choose to
be either workers, formal entrepreneurs or informal entrepreneurs. Agents
are di¤erentiated by their entrepreneurial ability (as in Lucas (1978) and
their initial wealth (as in Banerjee and Newman (1993)). Nevertheless,
since a employee can not sell its entrepreneurial skills as a worker then, as
in previous models, agents with low entrepreneurial skills become workers
that belong to the lower end of the income distribution. Meanwhile, in the
other hand, agents with high entrepreneurial skill will choose to become en-
trepreneurs (formal or informal) and they will belong to the upper end of
the income distribution. As we have already mentioned, in most developing
countries, informal entrepreneurs are poorer than formal workers.
Some evidence from a developing country is introduced in order to sup-
port an apparent stylized fact. We choose Mexico, a developing country,
since there is available data in order to study our claim. Figure 1 presents
data from the National Urban Employment Survey for Mexico (ENEU 2001),
describing the occupational distribution between self employees and workers
for di¤erent years of schooling. Group 00-00 represents the data for individ-
uals without schooling. In this table, 89% of the people in this group are
self-employees in the informal sector, while 11% are formal self-employees.
Notice that, 52% of all individuals without schooling have self-employment
as its occupational choice. Workers represent 47% of the total, almost
equally divided between formal and informal jobs. It should be stressed
out the decreasing role of self-employment when agents are better educated
and the increasing role of formal employment when schooling increases. In
the other hand, it is not necessary to show that individuals with low human
2capital belong to the lower end of the income distribution. Therefore, this
data shows that most small entrepreneurs are poorer than wage earners.
Because of this, traditional models of occupational choice might not be the
appropriate framework in order to study the occupation dynamics of some
developing economies.




































Figure 1: Distribution of Workers and Self Employees by Schooling Years
But, is it the lack of job opportunities what pushes agents into self-
employment in the informal sector? The answer to this question is extremely
important for our purposes. If the existence of self-employment is explain
by lack of opportunities then, instead of using a general equilibrium setup, a
disequilibrium model or one with labor market rigidities could be the most
appropriate too study self-employment dynamics. We do not pretend to
answer this question on a rigorous way. Nevertheless, we present some
evidence also for Mexico which could suggest an answer for a developing
country case.
Figure 2 shows that at low levels of education, the income of self-employees
is higher than that of workers. This relationship is reverse at higher levels
of education. This suggests that is probable that the choice of entering
self-employment is a income maximization decision rather than the lack of
employment opportunities. We do not pretend to prove extensively this
hypothesis, nevertheless it justi…es the choice of a general equilibrium type
model in order to address occupational choice issues.
This work will build a general equilibrium model where the decision to
become an entrepreneur, a worker or self-employed will be endogenous to
the model. As in Lucas (1978), the variable that will play a decisive role
on the occupational choice is the amount of human capital each agent has:
di¤erent levels of human capital will open di¤erent market opportunities to
agents. Therefore the choice of activity will depend on an initial distribution
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Figure 2: Income vs. Schooling
of human capital. On this model, we will prove that wage earners income
is higher than those agents on self-employment, consistent with data from
most LDC countries.
Additionally, from a dynamic point of view, there are countries that have
experienced a rise in both self-employment and wage employment, while
other countries have faced self-employment increase while salary employees
have decreased, and viceversa. That is, self-employment for some countries
is cyclical and for others counter-cyclical. Most theories typically explain
the countercyclical part, especially those theories who use market imperfec-
tions arguments in order to explain the rise of self-employment. This paper
will study conditions under which self-employment behaves in a cyclical or
countercyclical form.
2 An Economy with Self-Employment
The economy consists of a continuum of di¤erent types of agents. All indi-
viduals are endowed with a di¤erent educational level, where a continuum
between zero and one, describes the type of agent. That is,
i 2 [0;1]
where i¤ = 1 represents the individual with the highest educational level. We
choose to build a model where the level of Human Capital is an exogenous
4variable because of two main reasons: …rst of all, if agents could choose
endogenously their educational level will produce dynamic decision making
which will make di¢cult to study and characterize the equilibrium of the
model, on the other hand, exogenous human capital will allow us to analyze
the impact of public policy upon the distribution of human capital and the
equilibrium level.
Agents can perform two types of activities: low skill and high skill. Not
all agents are equally capable of performing high and low skill activities.
Probably no far from reality, all agents are equally capable of performing
low skill activities, that is
h(i) = h for all i;
where the productivity of an agent on a low skill activity is independent
of the educational level. On the other hand, agents with high educational
levels will be better at performing high skill activities. Therefore, we have
a function H(i)(where H
0
(i) > 0) that transforms educational level i into
a high skill abilities: Agents can o¤er, for a wage, their low or high skill
abilities to the market, where the income as a low skill worker and a high
skill worker are represented by
Ihw(i) = whh and IHw(i) = wHH(i);
where wh represents the low skill wage and wH the high skill wage rate. The
economy has two types of production technologies: the …rst one requires low
skill labor, where
Q(h;k) = minfk;h + lhg.
That is, an agent that decides to be a low skill technology entrepreneur
requires k units of capital, contributes with h units of low skill labor, and
hires (if pro…table) lh units of low skill labor. Therefore, the income of a
low skill entrepreneur (LSE) is
Ih(i) = minfk;h + lhg ¡ whlh ¡rk.
where r represents the rental rate of capital. An agent that decides to
be a LSE will choose lh that maximizes Ih(i). In order to have a well de-
…ned maximization problem, we keep the amount of capital as an exogenous
variable. Notice that the interest rate does not has a subindex h. This
re‡ects that, in order to simplify matters, we assume that there is only one
market for capital. Therefore, a low skill technology requires k units of
capital while, as it is explain later, a high skill technology requires K units
5of capital, where K > k. In order words, there are no low and high quality
hammers, high skill (HS) technologies require more hammers than low skill
(LS) technologies.
An agent i that chooses to be a HS entrepreneur: requires K units of
capital, provides H(i) units of administrative work, and hires lH units of
HS labor. An agent that decides to be a high skill entrepreneur (HSE) must
adopt the following technology
Q(H(i);K) = minfKH(i);lHg:
The …rst important di¤erence between the HS and the low skill (LS) tech-
nologies is that the HS technology needs two types of labor: HS skill labor
and an administrator of capital. In order to simplify matters, there is no
market for administrator activities1, therefore a HSE must use his/her high
skill abilities in order to ful…ll this activity. Since H(i) is increasing in i,
a highly educated agent will be a better administrator. Also, note that a
good administrator of scarce capital will optimally hire more labor than a
less capable one.
Assuming that the HS technology uses HS labor and not LS labor, is
central to the results of this work, since it introduces a labor market for
HS labor where highly educated people have a higher income. As it will
be explain on the following section, this assumption will allow us to have
a group of middle income agents that work for a salary and that are richer
than agents in self employment.
The income of a HSE will be, IH(i) = minfKH(i);lHg ¡ wHlH ¡ rK;
where optimally, lH = KH(i). Therefore,
IH(i) = K[H(i) ¡ wHH(i) ¡ r] (1)
Now we introduce our last assumption. Recall that the income of a LSE
is Ih(i) = minfk;h + lhg ¡ whlh ¡ rk: In order to simplify matters, assume
that k < h: Therefore, is redundant to hire LS workers, thus lh = 0 and,
Ih(i) = k(1 ¡ r). (2)
This assumption rules out the existence of a LS labor market, since
there is no demand for this type of abilities. Therefore, in order to simplify
notation, since there is only one market there is no need to introduce two
1For works where administrators hire other administrators see Garicano and Rossi
(2002)
6wages, we let IHw(i) = Iw(i) and wHH(i) = wH(i):For our purposes, a LSE
represents self employment decisions. Therefore,
Iw(i) = wH(i). (3)
Wrapping up, there are three occupational choices: HSE, LSE, and HS


























In the preceding graph, all agents such that H(i) < H1 will decide to be
LSE, agents where H1 < H(i) < H2 will prefer to work for a wage, while HSE
will be those that H2 < H(i): The graph is draw without paying attention
to the exogenous and endogenous parameters of the economy. As a mater
of fact, later on we will prove that at equilibrium, under speci…c values of
the exogenous parameters, it could be the case that no agents chooses to
be a LSE, and under di¤erent parameters, there is only an equilibrium with
a traditional sector(only self employment activities), and no modern sector
(i.e. no high skill sector).
Before proving our main hypothesis, some notation is introduced. Let,
'w(w) = fi 2 [0;1] : Iw(i) ¸ Ih(i) and Iw(i) ¸ IH(i)g.
In other words, 'w(w) represents the set of all agents that at wage rate w
will decide to be a LSE. Similarly, we can de…ne the set of agents that at a
7given wage rate, decide to become a worker or a HSE. That is, let
'h (w) = fi 2 [0;1] : Ih(i) ¸ Iw(i) and Ih(i) ¸ IH(i)g
and similarly,
'H(w) = fi 2 [0;1] : IH(i) ¸ Iw(i) and IH(i) ¸ Ih(i)g.
The main objective of this work is too study the dynamics of these three
sets.
We can prove some interesting and important properties of these sets:
Lemma 1 The sets 'i are convex sets.
The previous Lemma in interesting since it states that if there is a pair
of agents with educational levels between a and b, and choose an speci…c
occupation, then no agent that has an educational level between a and b
will optimally choose a di¤erent occupation. Convexity is not very common
to see in real economies. Nevertheless, this result will greatly simplify our
analysis. It is possible to choose an alternative speci…cation of the model
that produces non convexities, but at the cost of greater complexity when
characterizing the equilibrium. Also, it is easy to see from the de…nition of
the sets 'i that they are convex. The following Lemma states that all agents
must choose at least one occupation.
Lemma 2 'w [ 'h [ 'H = [0;1]
The next two theorems provide the proof of one of the main hypothesis
of this paper. The …rst theorem states that the LSE are the agents with the
lowest level of Human Capital, while the HSE are agents the highest.
Theorem 1 i) if i 2 'h(w) and i¤ 2 'w(w) then i · i¤ and ii) i 2 'w(w)
and i¤ 2 'H(w) then i · i¤
The second theorem will help us to fully characterized our main hypoth-
esis,
Theorem 2 i) if i 2 'h(w) and i¤ 2 'w(w) then Ih(i) · Iw(i¤) and ii) if
i 2 'w(w) and i¤ 2 'H(w) then Iw(i) · IH(i¤)
That is, the LSE not only are the agents with the lowest human capital
but the group with the lowest income, which proves our main goal: to build
a model that rationalizes the occupational choice data from some developing
economies. What is left of this paper, will make some comparative stat-
ics. In order to do this, we need to introduce an equilibrium concept. The
following section will do this.
83 Equilibrium
In order to characterize the demand and supply for labor, some notation
needs to be introduced. In particular, we need to de…ne who are the agents
with the lowest and highest educational levels that choose an speci…c occu-
pation. Let,
inf('j (w)) = fi¤ 2 'j (w) : i¤ < i;8i 2 'j(w)g for j = w;h;H:
In other words, for example, inf('w (w)) represents the worker with the
lowest human capital. Similarly, let
sup('j (w)) = fi¤ 2 'j (w) : i¤ > i;8i 2 'j(w)g for j = w;h;H:
be the agent from set 'j (w) with the highest human capital. We can easily
prove that:
Theorem 3 If 'j (w) are not empty sets then
i) inf('h (w)) = 0;
ii) sup('H (w)) = 1
iii) sup('h (w)) = inf('w (w))
iv) sup('w (w)) = inf('H (w))
That is, the previous theorem states that, i) the LSE with the lowest
human capital is also the agent with the lowest human capital and, similarly
ii) the HSE with the highest human capital is also the agent with the highest
human capital of the economy.
Let iwh ´ sup('h (w)) = inf('w (w)). We know that, since iwh 2 'h(w)
and iwh 2 'w(w); then Iw(iwh) = Ih(iwh)(i.e. if an agent is indi¤erent
between been a worker or a LSE is because the income from both occupations
is the same). Therefore,
k(1 ¡ r) = wH(iwh).
We cannot solve for iwh until we choose an speci…c distribution function for
H(i): Similarly, let iwh ´ sup('w (w)) = inf('H (w)). If an agent decides
either to be worker or a HSE is because the income from both occupations
is the same (i.e. Iw(iwH) = IH(iwH)): Therefore,
K[H(iwH)(1 ¡ w) ¡ r] = wH(iwH);
which we will have to wait to solve until next section, where we introduced
an speci…c functional form for H(i).
9Recall that the demand for labor from a HSE is LH = KH(i). With is
mind, we now de…ne the aggregate demand for labor,
$d(w) =
(




and the supply for labor
$s(w) =
(
0 if 'w(w) = ;
R sup('w(w))
inf('w(w)) H(i)di otherwise
As it is done in most general equilibrium models, we introduce an arbi-
trary occupational distribution, in order to ask if there is a wage rate such
that all agents choose voluntarily the occupational choice assign to them.
De…nition 1 (Occupational Equilibrium Distribution Vector OEDV)
Let X = fXh;Xw;XHg be an array of three subsets of [0;1] such that
Xw [ Xh [ XH = [0;1]. For given values of k;K and r we say that X
is an equilibrium occupational distribution vector (OEDV) if there is a wage
rate ^ w such that ,
i) Xi µ 'i(^ w)for i=h,w,H (income maximization)
ii) $s(^ w) = $d(^ w)(labor market equilibrium)
Notice that in our de…nition for OEDV, there is no equilibrium condition
for the capital market, we could think that our economy is a small country
that faces an exogenous interest rate and an inelastic supply for capital.
This will allow us later on to make some comparative statics concerning
changes in the exogenous interest rate and the capital requirements for both
technologies. In order to …nd an equilibrium for this economy, we need to
choose a speci…c representation for H(i); which transforms human capital
into high skill productivity. Before doing this, assuming that an equilibrium
exists, we can study some important properties of an OEDV.
Suppose that at a given wage rate w¤, the income as a worker of the most
educated agent is equal to its income as a LSE (i.e. w¤H(1) = k(1 ¡r)). If
this is the case, every agent with a human capital lower than 1 will decide
to become a LSE since this occupation provides a higher return. Therefore,
at a wage rate lower than w¤ = k(1 ¡ r)=H(1), no agent will choose to
be a worker . Similarly, assume that at the wage rate w¤, the income as
a worker of the most educated agent is equal to its income as a HSE (i.e.
10K[H(1)(1 ¡ w¤) ¡ r] = wH(1). If this is the case, as the following graph
shows, every agent we a human capital lower than one will not choose to be
































Therefore, at any wage rate higher than w¤ no agent in the economy chooses
HSE as an occupational activity. That is,
Lemma 3 If w <
k(1¡r)








In other words, lemma 3 provides necessary conditions for the existence
an OEDV where there is a modern sector with high skill workers and HSE,
also presents a su¢cient condition for the existence of an equilibrium with
only self employment. Unfortunately, the wage rate w is an endogenous
variable to the model, nevertheless it is easy to combine both conditions to
study an interesting result in terms of exogenous variables only:








H(1) (condition a) then X¤ = f[0;1],;;;g
is the only OEDV.







< ^ w <
k(1¡r)
H(1) . Because of Lemma 3, 'H(^ w) = ; and
'w(^ w) = ;: Therefore, $s(^ w) = $d(^ w) = 0 and, because of Lemma 1,
'h(^ w) = [0;1]. That is, ^ w is a wage rate such that Xi µ 'i(^ w) for i=h,w,H
and $s(^ w) = $d(^ w);therefore X¤ = f[0;1],;;;g is an OEDV. Now, if we
choose a wage rate that is lower than the LHS of the inequality, because of
Lemma 3 no one will choose to be a worker and we have an excess demand
for labor. Finally if w is higher than the RHS inequality, no one is a LSE
and we have an excess supply for labor.
Now, imaging that at a given wage rate w¤, the income as a worker
of the less educated agent is equal to its income as a LSE (i.e. w¤H(0) =
k(1¡r)). If this is the case, every agent with a level of human capital higher
than 0 will choose to be worker over been a LSE since H() is an increasing
function. In other words, at a wage rate higher than w¤ = k(1 ¡ r)=H(0),
no agent will choose to be a LSE since been a worker provides a higher
return. Similarly, imaging that the at a given wage rate w¤, the income
as a LSE of the least educated agent is equal to its income as a HSE (i.e.
k(1¡r) = K[H(0)(1¡w¤)¡r]). If this is the case, at any wage rate lower
than w¤, no agent will choose to be a HSE since becoming a worker provides
a higher return. That is, solving for w, we get
Lemma 4 If w >
k(1¡r)









As we did in the previous theorem, we can combine the previous lemmas











(condition b) and an OEDV
exists then 'h(^ w) = ;:
Their is an important di¤erence between theorems 4 and : First of all,
theorem 4 states su¢cient conditions for the existence of an OEDV, while
5 needs to assume that an OEDV exists. Later on, we will build economies
which, under certain parameters, even if condition b holds, an equilibrium
fails to exists, while in the other hand, if condition a holds an OEDV with
12X¤ = f[0;1],;;;g will always exist. We will use theorems 4 and 5 to present
a graph that illustrates our results this far. First, notice that condition a





[H(1) ¡ r] < k,




























Where, if the exogenous variables H(1) and k are in the area A of the
graph, because of theorem 4, then at equilibrium 'w = ; and 'H = ; (no
modern sector). On the other hand, if H(1) and k are in the area A, and
an equilibrium exists, then 'h = ;: The variables H(1) and k were chosen
to draw the graph since there are the ones that have a linear relationship
between them; this simpli…es the presentation. These results are highly in-
tuitive, if there is a big enough increase in k, since the productivity and
income of LHS increases, less agents will be willing to choose other occu-
pations. Similarly, if H(1) increases, more agents will choose to be HSE,
increasing the demand for labor, thus the wage rate. Because of this, more
agents will leave the low skill sector of the economy and work for a wage.
13This is as far as we can go without de…ning an speci…c functional form for
H(i):
Nevertheless, these results have interesting implication in public policy:
the road towards economic development is not only a movement into the
area B of the graph (i.e. an economy with a modern sector and without
self employment). Since any point that is further away from the origin
represents a higher per capita income, moving into the area A (i.e. only a
traditional sector) is also a feasible way of increasing income and promoting
development. In other words, a contraction of the modern sector together
with an expansion of the self employment sector, does not necessarily pro-
duces economic stagnation.
Assume for a moment that H(0) = H(1), which means that schooling
provides no value added into improving high skill abilities. If this is the
case, notice that conditions a and b are the same but with the inequality
sign reverse. This means that, if there is no value added from schooling,
the economy will have either only a modern sector or a traditional one.
The simultaneous presence at equilibrium of both sectors is the result of an
educational sector that provides value added.
4 A Uniform Distribution
Assume that the function H : [0;1] ! <¸0 has the following uniform distri-
bution,
H(i) = ® + ¯i,
where the lowest level of high skill is H(0) = ® and the highest is H(1) = ®+
¯. Recall from the previous section that, iwH = inf('H(w)) = sup('w(w))
then, since iwH is indi¤erent between been a worker or a HSE, it must be the
case that K[H(iwH)(1 ¡ w) ¡ r] = wH(iwH): Now we know the functional
form of H(i), thus substituting H(i) and solving for iwH we get
iwH =
r





Therefore, if 'H(w) 6= ;; we can …nd the demand for labor where $d(w) =
K
R 1
inf('H(w)) H(i)di. Similarly, recall that iwh = inf('w(w)) = inf('h(w))
where k(1 ¡ r) = wH(iwh) therefore we substitute H(i) and we solve for















which, after evaluating the integral, we get K[H(1)]2 ¡ K[H(iwH)]2 =
[H(iwH)]2 ¡ [H(iwh)]2: It is not possible to …nd a close form solution for
this equation, therefore we present some numerical solutions.
4.1 Numerical Simulations
Since we can not …nd a solution for the equilibrium wage rate, we do some
numerical simulations. These results will allow us to do some compara-
tive statics. To this end, choose the following values for the exogenous
parameters of the model,
® = 1;¯ = 2;k = 2;K = 5;r = :2
These values of the parameters were chosen in such a way that is feasible to
…nd an inner solution, that is one where at equilibrium he have a modern as
well as a self employment sector (i.e. 'j(w) > 0 for j = w;h;H): Therefore,
this parameters violate conditions a and b;otherwise we would have a corner
solution. The equilibrium values for some endogenous parameters of the
model are
w = 0:77;iwH = 0:93;iwh = 0:53
Recall that iwH represents the agent which is indi¤erent between been either
a worker or a HSE, therefore iwH = 0:93 means that 7% of the agents will
choose to be HSE, while iwh represents the agent that is indi¤erent to choose
between been a worker or a LSE, thus iwh = 53 means that 53% are LSE,
while iwH ¡ iwH = 40% will be workers.
4.1.1 Impact of Changes on Human Capital
Since all agents are indexed in the interval [0;1];that represents schooling,
we cannot change Human Capital. Nevertheless, we can change parameters
of the H(i) function, which represents how Human Capital transfers into
productive skills. On our model, low skill is constant to all agents and
independent of i, and since low skill productivity is higher than the available
capital k, we cannot study the impact of an increase in low skill productivity
without changing, as mentioned in the section 2, the structure of the model.
Nevertheless, we can study the impact in changes in the parameters of the
15function the transfers schooling into high skill productivity. Recall that
H(i) = ® + ¯i, therefore an increase in ¯ symbolizes an overall increase
high skill productivity. We can expect an increase in the number of HSE,
therefore an increase in wages, generating an incentive to leave LSE sector.
To verify our intuition, we increase one parameter to ¯ = 5 while keeping
constant the rest of the parameters. As before, the new parameters satisfy
the necessary conditions in order to avoid a corner solution. The equilibrium
values are,
w = 0:80;iwh = 0:20; and iwH = 0:91
where, as expected, there is an increase in wage, a sharp drop in the number
of LSE, 69% been workers, and 9% entrepreneurs. These results are also
consistent with …gure 4 from the previous section in the sense that the
increase in ¯ is similar to an increase in H(1), therefore the economy moves
closer to region B from …gure 4, which means that it moves closer to an
economy where there is only a modern sector, consistent with the increase
in HSE from this exercise.
We omit the exercise of an increasing ® since the impact is similar.
Notice that the LSE sector moved on a countercyclical form. That is, while
the total product in the economy increased, the LSE sector contracted.
4.1.2 Impact of Changes in Low Skill Capital
We now turn to study the impact of an increase in k. A change on this
variable can be read in two di¤erent ways: it could represent a relaxation of a
borrowing constraint, or a technological change in the LS sector, where more
capital is required. In either case, a more productive LS sector, will reduce
agents willingness to work for a wage, thus reducing the supply for labor,
increasing the wage rate, thus reducing the amount HSE. To illustrate this
movement we return the original parameters selected for model, but instead
we choose k = 2:5. In equilibrium,
w = 0:78;iwh = 0:79 and iwH = 0:97
which con…rms the increase in wages, LSE, and the decrease in workers and
HSE.
4.1.3 Impact of Changes in the Interest Rate
A decrease in r could produce ambiguous results on the number of LSE.
First of all, a decrease in the interest rate, increases pro…ts of the HSE, thus
16increasing the demand for labor and the wage rate. The LSE confront two
opposing forces: the decrease in r improves the incentives to become a LSE,
nevertheless the increase in wages reduces these incentives. The same for
HSE, the cost of capital decreases, but in the other hand, they face a higher
wage rate. To show this, we return to the original parameters of the model
and we set r = :1, and we get,
w = 0:80;iwH = 0:94;iwh = 0:62
where the wage rate has increased, together with a contraction of the HSE
sector and an expansion of the LSE. Nevertheless, with a di¤erent set of
parameters these results do not hold. Let ® = 0;¯ = 1;k = 1=2;K = 2 and
r = :2:The equilibrium values are: w = 0:52; iwH = 0:928; and iwh = 0:764.
Now decrease the cost of capital to r = :1:We obtain,
w = 0:59;ih = 0:756 and iH = 0:926
where the results have reversed: the wage rate still increases (as predicted)
but the LSE reduces and the HSE increases. Is it possible to …nd a set of
parameters for which these results always hold? It is not possible, but the
necessary conditions to avoid a corner solution could give us a hint. Recall
that a necessary condition for the existence of an OEDV with HSE and











Rearranging terms and substituting H(i) yields,
K
1 + K
(® + ¯) + rZ ¡ k > 0
where




It is clear what happens to the LHS of the previous equation if ® + ¯
increases, but if the interest changes, the impact will depend on the sign
of Z: If the LHS decreases, we are moving closer to the area A from …gure
4, where there is an equilibrium with LSE only. Now, if the interest rate
decreases and Z > 0 then the LHS decreases. Therefore, if this is the case,
we could expect an expansion of the LSE .
In the …rst numerical solution, there is an expansion of the LSE when
the interest rate decreased. Notice that Z = 2 ¡ 5=6 > 0. In the second
17example, the HSE increased and Z= 1=2¡2=3 < 0. The economic intuition
of these results is straightforward: if k is large enough, a reduction of the
interest rate will provide strong incentives to move into LS entrepreneurial
activities. If not, the increase in wages will upset the small decrease in costs,
therefore some LSE will change occupation, deciding to become workers.
Notice that the income of all agents of the economy has increased in both
cases, as a result of the lower interest rate. Nevertheless, depending on the
parameters of the model, the LSE sector could expand or contract. That
is, this exercise provides conditions under which the LSE sector behaves on
a cyclical or countercyclical form.
4.1.4 An Exponential Distribution
This section introduces a di¤erent distribution for the transfer of schooling
into High skill abilities, this will allow us to study some public policy choices.
Assume that H(i) has the following exponential uniform distribution.
H(i) = ®e¯i
where the most educated individual has ®e¯ units of high skill, while the
least educated, could supply ® units of high skill labor to the market. With
this new distribution we look for the new values for iwh and iwh, where
iwh =




ln(r) ¡ ln[®(1 ¡ w ¡ w
K)]
¯
We can prove that if $d(w) = $s(w) and evaluating the integral we get
KH(1) ¡ KH(iwH) = H(iwH) ¡ H(iwh): Again, is not possible to …nd an
analytical solution for w therefore a numerical solution is presented.
We compare results between the uniform and the exponential distribu-
tions, by introducing a public policy option. Assume that the policy maker
has the possibility of shifting resources in other to increase to e¤ectivity
of schooling to the latest years of education. That is imaging that we re-
duce resources in elementary and secondary and we increase them in higher
education.
The following picture captures this policy alternative. The goal is to
choose the parameters for both distributions in such a way that the area
18under the curve is the same for both distributions, re‡ecting that the total
amount of value added of education is the same one, the only di¤erence
is that the exponential distribution generates higher returns on the later
years of education, while punishing the returns from early schooling (better








We choose parameters in such a way that H(0) is the same for both
distributions since the amount of high skill level which agents are born with
it is not a policy variable, the way value added is distributed by education
is the only policy variable, therefore in both cases H(0) = ®. Our task is to
choose ¯ in such way that the area under the geometric distributions is the
same one than the area under the uniform distribution. We can proof that
¯ = ln(k¯u + 1)
where ¯u represents the parameter for the uniform distribution and k the
area under its curve. Choose the parameters from the …rst numerical exam-
ple in the previous section, ®¤ = ® = 1and ¯¤ = 2, therefore we can prove
that ¯ = 3:513: Now choosing as before k = 2;K = 5; and r = :2, we get,
w = 0:82744;iH = 0:95136;ih = 0:18771
where the number of LSE decreased from iwh = 0:53 to iwh = :18, while the
HSE have decreased from 7% to 4.9% of the total population. The change in
19the distribution H(i) while keeping constant the total value added into HS
productivity, has produced higher returns from HSE, therefore generating
an increase n the demand for worker, which rises the wage rate, driving this
way agents out of self employment. It is not di¢cult to proof that new
eqilibrium is Pareto improving.
5 Conclusions (in progress)
Empirical data seems to show that traditional models are not the best way
to describe some facts from some developing economies. Nevertheless, is
possible to build a model that rationalizes these observations. This model
could allow us to study developing aspects from some developing economies.
In particular studies alternative paths towards development. The most
important aspect of this work is to build a model that analyses the parame-
ters that determine the size of the self-employment sector under a general
equilibrium framework. Even an analytical solution was not found, it was
possible to study the properties of equilibria, assuming that one exist. The
proof for existence was complete for the self-employment case, nevertheless
we built economies for which an equilibrium exists with both the modern
and traditional sector. Also, we studied the conditions under which the
self-employment sector behaves on a cyclical or counter cyclical form. Some
policy issued were studied. Nevertheless, is open the study of most of the
exogeneous parameters. Changes in the amount of physical capital could
be of special interest.
6 Appendix
1. Proof (Lemma 1) . a) Convexity of 'h. We want to prove that if
i 2 'h(w) and i
0
2 'h(w); then i
00
2 'h(w) where i
00
= ®i + (1 ¡ ®)
i
0
and ® 2 [0;1]: Assume that where i < i0. Since i
0
2 'h(w) we






and H() is increasing
in i, then k(1 ¡ r) > wH(i
00
): It is left to prove that k(1 ¡ r) >
K[(1¡w)H(i
00
)¡r)]: Again, since i
0
2 'h(w) we know that k(1¡r) >
K[(1¡w)H(i
00




and H() is increasing in i, then
k(1 ¡ r) > K[(1 ¡ w)H(i
00
) ¡r)]:
b) Convexity of 'w:Since i 2 'w(w) we know that wH(i) > k(1 ¡
r);therefore since i < i
00
and H() is increasing in i, then wi
00
> k(1 ¡
20r):It is left to prove that wH(i
00
) > K[(1 ¡ w)H(i
00
) ¡ r)]. Since
i
0
2 'w(w) then wH(i
0
) > K[(1 ¡ w)H(i
0
) ¡ r)]. Solving for H(i) we
get H(i)[(1 ¡ w) ¡ w
K] < r: If [(1 ¡ w) ¡ w
K] < 0, then the inequality
holds for all i. In the other hand if [(1¡w) ¡ w
K] > 0; since H() is an
increasing function, the inequality holds for all i · i0;therefore it holds
for i00.
c) Convexity of 'H: Since i 2 'H(w) then K[(1 ¡ w)H(i) ¡ r)] >
k(1 ¡ r). Therefore, since H() is increasing in i and i00 > i then
K[(1¡w)H(i
00





): Since i 2 'H(w) we know that K[(1¡w)H(i)¡r)] > wH(i).
Solving the previous inequality for H(i) we get H(i)[K
w (1 ¡ w)¡1] >
K
wr: We know that [K
w (1 ¡ w)¡1] > 0 therefore, since i00 > i and H()
is increasing, the inequality holds for i00.
Proof (Theorem 1). Since i 2 'h(w) then k(1 ¡ r) > wH(i),
also since i¤ 2 'w(w) then wH(i¤) > k(1 ¡ r)i therefore H(i¤) >
H(i): Now, since H(i) is an increasing function then i¤ > i: b) Since
i 2 'w(w) then wH(i) > K[(1 ¡ w)H(i) ¡ r)]: Rearranging terms we
get r > H(i)[(1 ¡ w) ¡ w
K] . Also, since i¤ 2 'H(w), it must be the
case that K[(1 ¡ w)H(i¤) ¡ r)] < wH(i¤):Rearranging terms we get
H(i¤)[(1¡w)¡ w
K] > r therefore H(i¤) > H(i): Now, since H(i) is an
increasing function then i¤ > i.
Proof (Theorem 2). i) By de…nition we know that Ih(i) = k(1¡r)
and that Iw(i¤) = wH(i), since i¤ 2 'w(w) it must be the case that
wH(i¤) > k(1 ¡ r) therefore Iw(i¤) > Ih(i):
ii) By de…nition we know that Iw(i) = wH(i) and that IH(i¤) =
K[(1¡w)H(i¤)¡r)], since i¤ 2 'H(w) it must be the case that K[(1¡
w)H(i¤)¡r)] > wH(i¤):From theorem 1 we know that if i 2 'w(w) and
i¤ 2 'H(w) then i > i¤. Since H(i) is an increasing function and i¤ > i
then H(i¤) > H(i), therefore K[(1¡w)H(i¤)¡r)] > wH(i¤) > wH(i)
which proves that IH(i¤) > Iw(i):
Proof (Theorem 3). i) Let i0 = inf('h(w)): Assume that i0 6=
0;then 0 = 2 'h(w) and either 0 2 'w(w) or 0 2 'H(w): If 0 2 'w(w)
then it exists an i00 = 0 such that i00 2 'w(w) where i00 < i0:This
contradicts theorem 2 where if i00 2 'w(w) then i00 > i for all i 2
'h(w):We build the same argument for the case 0 2 'H(w).
ii) Let i0 = sup('H(w)): Assume that i0 6= 1;then 1 = 2 'H(w) and
either 1 2 'w(w) or 1 2 'h(w): If 1 2 'w(w) then it exists an i00 = 1
such that i00 2 'w(w) and i00 > i0:This contradicts theorem 2 where if
21i00 2 'w(w) then i00 < i for all i 2 'H(w):We build the same argument
for the case where 1 2 'h(w).
iii) Assume that sup('h(w)) 6= inf('w(w)): Let i0 = sup('h(w)) and
i00 = inf('w(w)):If sup('h(w)) > inf('w(w)) then there exist i0 2
'h(w) and i00 2 'w(w) such that i0 > i00:This contradicts theorem 2
where if i00 2 'w(w) then i00 > i for all i 2 'h(w): Now if sup('h(w)) <
inf('w(w)) then it must exist an i000 2 'H(w) such that sup('h(w)) <
i000 < inf('w(w)): Recall that 1 2 'H(w) therefore i000 < inf('w(w)) <
1, but since i000 2 'H(w);this violates the convexity of 'H(w) from
theorem 1.
iv) Assume that sup('w(w)) 6= inf('H(w)): Let i0 = sup('w(w)) and
i00 = inf('H(w)):If sup('w(w)) > inf('H(w)) then there exist i0 2
'w(w) and i00 2 'H(w) such that i0 > i00:This contradicts theorem 2
where if i00 2 'H(w) then i00 > i for all i 2 'w(w): Now if sup('w(w)) <
inf('H(w)) then it must exist an i000 2 'h(w) such that sup('w(w)) <
i000 < inf('H(w)): Recall that 0 2 'h(w) therefore 0 < sup('w(w)) <
i000, but since i000 2 'h(w);this violates the convexity of 'h(w) from
theorem 1.
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